

Pacific Partners Wargame Analysis STRATEGIC WARGAMING SERIES



24-25 September 2014



UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE Center for Strategic Leadership & Development 650 Wright Ave Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

The findings contained in this report are based on the results of an academic wargame conducted at the United States Army War College 24-25 September 2014. Except where expressly indicated, the ideas presented are derived directly from the comments of wargame participants (with their agreement to 'non-attribution'). The views contained in this report are intended to inform senior Army leaders including, but not confined to, members of the Army Staff, Geographic Combatant Commands and Army Service Component Commands. This report does not express the policies or official views of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Army.

Game Director / Lead Author:
Lead Analyst:
Chief, Strategic Wargaming Division:
LTC Robert Scanlon
Ms. Darlene Pittenger
COL Jack Pritchard

robert.j.scanlon6.mil@mail.mil
darlene.k.pittenger.civ@mail.mil
jack.k.pritchard.mil@mail.mil

STRENGTH and WISDOM

maintaining the data needed, and c including suggestions for reducing	lection of information is estimated to ompleting and reviewing the collect this burden, to Washington Headqu uld be aware that notwithstanding an DMB control number	ion of information Send comments arters Services, Directorate for Info	s regarding this burden estimate ormation Operations and Reports	or any other aspect of the s, 1215 Jefferson Davis	his collection of information, Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington		
1. REPORT DATE SEP 2014		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2014 to 00-00-2014			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER					
Pacific Partners W		5b. GRANT NUMBER					
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
					5e. TASK NUMBER		
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
					8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITO	RING AGENCY NAME(S) A	ND ADDRESS(ES)	S(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)				
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAII Approved for publ	LABILITY STATEMENT ic release; distributi	on unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NO	OTES						
14. ABSTRACT							
15. SUBJECT TERMS							
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON		
a REPORT unclassified	ь abstract unclassified	c THIS PAGE unclassified	Same as Report (SAR)	23	REST ONSIDEE I ERSON		

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188



Pacific Partners

Wargame 6-14

United States Army War College Strategic Wargaming Series

Executive Summary

On 24-25 September 2014, the U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership and Development conducted an unclassified Strategic Seminar Wargame (SSWG) entitled *PACIFIC PARTNERS*. This was the second in a proposed three-part series to examine deterrence, shaping, and conflict de-escalation / resolution in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The *PACIFIC PARTNERS SSWG* was designed to identify and describe potential modifications to improve U.S. engagement activities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific in the support of U.S. national security interests; associated potential obstacles or risks; and implications for the U.S. Army.

Participants examined activities associated with three engagement Lines of Effort (LOE), as identified by the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) engagement model, in addition to the potential obstacles and risks associated with the proposed modifications. The three engagement LOE examined were:

- 1. Build Defense Relationships
- 2. Exercise Interoperability
- 3. Military Professionalism Exchanges

While most participants had a positive view of USARPAC engagement activities, they were still able to develop ideas for ways to improve engagement activities by modifying or consolidating current activities or adding new activities to promote attainment of regional objectives. Participants indicated that two LOE, Building Defense Relationships and Exercising Interoperability, could benefit most from some modifications, especially as related to including China in those activities. Participants also developed ideas regarding Military Professionalism Exchanges in order to promote greater understanding of Rule of Law issues, as well as a means to address increasingly complex international events. Participants emphasized that enhanced engagement with China needs to be a higher priority, if not a central element, of U.S. engagement in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

Key Findings

- Although physically dominated by water, land forces remain the predominant military component in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Participants described the region as "maritime," but cautioned against equating that term with naval forces, especially given the size and capabilities of regional navies.
- U.S. military engagement activities must be carefully synchronized and tailored in order to avoid overwhelming partner nation abilities to host/participate.
- A Theater Joint Forces Land Component Commander (TJFLCC), Coalition Joint Forces Land Component Commander (CJFLCC) or an overarching coordination capability through a permanent secretariat, such as Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) could serve to synchronize, tailor, and manage regional engagements from a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational perspective.

- Further development of Senior Leader Seminars (SLS) respectively with the three large land powers (China, India, and Indonesia) could provide a cost effective way to develop and refine additional engagement activities in the region.¹
- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief training operations are more relevant to regional partners than combat training. Such exercises also provide a natural avenue for promoting interoperability and other engagement activities in a non-combat setting.
- Employ scenarios involving potential future operating environments, such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) in megacities [population greater than 10 million], as drivers for engagement activities in order to develop appropriate response capabilities prior to needing them. 15 of the world's 28 megacities are located in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.²
- Develop a Peace Keeping Exercise Program with China in order to provide an opening step to further engagement. This will also serve to reassure partners that they are not required to choose between the U.S. or China.
- Establish a Military Legal Exchange/Seminar with multiple regional partners, including China, as part of a Joint Military Legal Exchange Program in order to promote Rule of Law training and foster conditions for further engagement within the bounds of U.S. policy.
- Expand community of interest exchanges by creating more inclusive, enduring multiorganizational forums to include: Rule of Law, specialized fields in medicine,
 environmental, cyber, transportation, computers, and engineering, because future
 problem sets will require expertise not resident within military and government
 institutions.
- Review current engagement activities for potential to free resources by merging similar
 or supporting activities such as: Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) and
 Counter Terrorism; conducting Logistics Operations Actions and Activities (OAA) in
 conjunction with other exercises or exchanges; and including Medical OAA within HA/DR
 Civil-Military Operations. In addition to freeing resources for other engagements, this
 may enhance the effectiveness of existing activities by providing improved context for
 the topics.

Questions for Further Development

 Would engaging with China outside the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region be easier or more productive than engaging within the region?

¹ In the event that these activities are already being conducted, USARPAC could indicate that the countries listed on its Engagement Model are a representative sample of USARPAC engagement, rather than an all-inclusive list.

² United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division *World Urbanization Prospects: The* 2014 Revision, Highlights (ST/ESA/SER.A/352) (New York, 2014), 9.

http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf; improved resolution of referenced graphic: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Maps/CityDistribution/CityPopulation/2014_City_Urban.pdf (Accessed December 23, 2014)

- Does engagement with competitors/potential enemies really serve to deter, rather than promote conflict? (Do countries use these events as opportunities to plan against U.S. weaknesses and/or collect information about capabilities?)
- Under what conditions would the U.S. government consider employing military forces within a megacity environment?

Intentionally Blank

Report on Pacific Partners Wargame

Overview

On 24-25 September 2014, the U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership and Development conducted an unclassified Strategic Seminar Wargame (SSWG) entitled *PACIFIC PARTNERS*. This was the second in a proposed three part series to examine deterrence, shaping, and conflict de-escalation / resolution in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. The *PACIFIC PARTNERS SSWG* was designed to identify and describe potential modifications to partnering activities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, associated potential obstacles or risks, and implications for the U.S. Army.

The PACIFIC PARTNERS SSWG brought together 18 specialists with expertise on the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, international relations and national security affairs from academia, think-tanks, and U.S. government agencies to consider ways to improve U.S. military engagement activities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific in the support of U.S. national security interests³. The U.S. Army Pacific provided an initial scene setter briefing in order to establish a common understanding of current and planned partnering activities in the region prior to participants dividing into two smaller discussion groups.

Both discussion groups included regional experts, planners, and international affairs experts. The expertise of one group ("The Mainland") centered upon countries associated with the Asian mainland. The expertise of the other group ("The Islands") centered upon island nations. During facilitated, non-attribution sessions each group addressed potential modifications within three engagement Lines of Effort (LOE), as identified by the U.S. Army Pacific engagement model. Participants also addressed potential obstacles and risks associated with their proposed modifications. The three engagement LOE examined were:

- 1. Build Defense Relationships
- 2. Exercise Interoperability
- 3. Military Professionalism Exchanges

The panel rejoined for a final session during which each group presented its recommended modifications in order to afford all participants an opportunity to question and challenge each other.

Results

Facilitators for both groups began discussions by having participants provide an assessment of the three engagement LOE based upon 16 associated engagement activities.⁴ Participants were provided voting sheets with a list of the engagement activities and asked to assess each one as either: No change needed; change would be helpful; discontinue; or no opinion.⁵ Overall, participants viewed the Military Professionalism Exchange LOE as generally working well and not requiring significant change. Participant responses indicated that the remaining two LOEs, Building Defense Relationships and Exercising Interoperability, could both benefit from some modifications.

³ Planning for this wargame considered regional ends identified in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review: maintenance of open access to shared domains, promotion of a just international order, and free and open commerce ⁴ See Appendix A for listing of specific engagement activities associated with LOE (Post-game analysis, based upon the number of "No Opinion" responses, indicates that participants may have had little understanding of two engagement activities, *Pacific Resilience* and *Agile Mission Command*.)

⁵ See Appendix B for raw data

Context

The groups examined engagement activities as means to address current and future challenges; however, each group framed its discussion of current and future challenges in slightly different ways.

The Mainland group viewed the challenges primarily in terms of countries and their interactions with others in the region. Specifically, they were concerned with the U.S., Afghanistan, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Taiwan. Other challenges that they considered included: trans-national threats, such as terrorism and narcotics; non-traditional security challenges, such as food security and environmental issues; natural disasters; and territorial claims and disputes, such as the various maritime claims and disputes in the East and South China Seas.

The Islands group defined the challenges in terms of what they viewed as key drivers in Indo-Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: Capacity, PRC influence, and the maritime nature of the operating environment. The group highlighted increasing fiscal and other resource constraints impacting U.S. capacity to conduct, and partner nation capacity to absorb, engagement activities. The group also noted that PRC influence and its effects are perceived differently by each nation in the region. While describing the nature of the operating environment as maritime, the group made a point of ensuring that this description of the environment was not a prescription for a particular service domain. In summary, the group determined that the security cooperation drivers spoke to the requirement for a tailored, coordinated Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational approach to engagements in the region.

Based upon the identified challenges, the groups looked for ways to improve engagement activities along the previously identified lines of effort.

Build Defense Relationships

Senior Leader Seminars (SLS) and Land Force Talks with India, the People's Republic of China, and Indonesia would improve relationships, as well as prospects for additional future activities with these three larger land powers in the region. While USARPAC conducts engagement activities with these nations within other lines of effort, senior leader engagements could prove particularly useful in reinforcing or expanding relationships, and also further influence interactions at lower levels. Senior level engagements require fewer resources, making them less costly in financial terms, than most engagement activities; however, they require senior leaders' time – a scarce resource in its own right.

Specifically related to China, additional senior level engagement may serve to reassure China regarding U.S. intentions in the region, while also providing China opportunities to disclose details regarding its policies and regional intentions, and develop a path toward recognition as a stabilizing force in the region. According to participants, U.S. Leaders should

_

⁶ Senior Leader Seminars (SLS), Land Forces Talks (LFT), and Executive Steering Groups (ESG) are types of senior level engagements. The SLS program is a military seminar (bilateral or multilateral) that provides a forum for senior-level officers to exchange views, convey information, and enhance strong interpersonal relationships among the current and future senior leaders of the services. LFTs and ESGs are led by USARPAC, and include other joint components, in order to codify multi-year programs/activities that advance mutual U.S./partner nation objectives. ESG focus on the partner nation Army, while LFT generally also include other partner nation security forces.

anticipate that China will seek to engage on more traditional military topics, beyond the current engagement activities related to disaster management. Participants explained that China views traditional military activities as more meaningful engagement activities for armed forces than the disaster management activities, which they consider more of a police activity.

Options for implementing such engagements include bilateral, and various levels of multilateral venues. While senior leader engagements typically take place as bilateral events, the U.S. Defense Department, in collaboration with the State Department, may determine that a multilateral format is more appropriate to gain a shared understanding of issues of mutual interest. Other options might provide for one or more members from other branches of the U.S. government to participate in the engagement in order to highlight other subsequent benefits or advantages that could be derived from specific military engagements.

Obstacles and risks include the previously noted limitations on Commanders' time availability. A U.S. Commander could easily become overcommitted by an expansive 36 country region. Regional countries not invited to participate may misread U.S. intentions and require reaffirmation of their relationship with the U.S. via other means. Extending SLS to China in particular, may require additional effort to reassure regional allies and partners.

The most notable challenge related to such engagements are the limitations to military interaction with China in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 and subsequent years⁷. Beyond those limitations, there remains a question regarding the proper Chinese counterpart, or counterparts, with whom the USARPAC Commander should engage. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) structure differs from that of the U.S. Army, which complicates establishing a counterpart of comparable rank/position with whom the USARPAC Commander can engage.

Exercise Interoperability

The high probability of natural disasters in the region makes Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) planning and activities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region a natural opportunity for promoting security cooperation with emerging partners. Such engagements might also present an opportunity to develop a standing regional capability to routinely address HA/DR situations throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

Risks and obstacles associated with expanding emphasis on HA/DR partnering activities mainly revolve around perceptions. Regional countries may interpret emphasis on HA/DR as a U.S. Army perception that partner nations are capable only of HA/DR. Alternatively, partner nations may overestimate the importance of HA/DR exercises and need to be persuaded to maintain a balance of security related and HA/DR exercises in order to ensure interoperability extends to the full range of military operations. The PRC may also view an expansion of HA/DR as a disguised containment effort, especially if it is excluded from events. Obstacles include resource constraints, both for the U.S. and partner nations. Limitations on the types and number of exercises will require collaboration to ascertain appropriate prioritization and scheduling. The previously mentioned coordination capability could help to mitigate risks and obstacles by providing inclusive, multilateral planning and balanced exercise scheduling. Including representatives from the Chinese PLA during exercise planning and execution would help avoid perceptions of containment, but may also have mixed impact on participation by other partners – both positive and negative. In the event that such coordination with the PLA

⁷ "National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000." (P.L. 106-65), *United States Statutes at Large.* 113 Stat. 779-781. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ65/pdf/PLAW-106publ65.pdf (Accessed December 23, 2014)

would exceed limitations on U.S. military forces, one of the partner nations may be able to assume lead coordination responsibilities.

A Theater Joint Forces Land Component Commander (TJFLCC), Coalition Joint Forces Land Component Commander (CJFLCC) or overarching coordination capability through a permanent secretariat, such as Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could serve to synchronize, tailor and manage regional engagements from a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) perspective.⁸ This organization could also function as a tool to synchronize exercises and other engagements in order to avoid overwhelming partner capacity to receive U.S. engagement activities. A multilateral forum such as this could also serve as a tool to assist in reducing existing regional animosities through continued interaction, and contribute toward a standing regional capability.

The TJFLCC construct, using the supported and supporting commander paradigm could be employed in planning, exercising, and executing operations and exercises requiring integration of the human, technical and operational aspects under one coordinating body. While the organization need not be U.S. led nor dominated, the U.S. would need to at least provide its own joint interagency coordination cell to interact with the TJFLCC. U.S. interagency representation may prove crucial, especially in situations where the military provides a supporting role to civilian operations.

Wargame participants recommended that USARPAC consider incorporating challenges associated with future operating environments, specifically cities with populations greater than 10 million (megacities)⁹ into its Interoperability Exercises, given that 15 of the world's current 28 megacities are located in Asia. 10 Participants expanded on the megacity theme by recommending Peace Keeping (PK) and Counter Terrorism (CT) operations as specific operations anticipated to be conducted within megacity expansive urban environments.

The significant probability of natural disasters in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, coupled with the concentration of megacities in the region, implies a requirement to plan for HA/DR and other contingencies in megacity environments. Land power engagement can help better prepare the region by emphasizing megacity-based response scenarios. The scope of a crisis within a megacity environment very likely could require significant numbers of civilians and civilian organizations, to include Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), in order to stabilize the situation. The potential for interaction with such a variety of organizations supports the previously described concept of developing a TJFLCC or similar organization.

⁸ On May 30, 2014, USPACOM TJFLCC processes, relationships, and tasks were formalized through a memorandum of understanding, which includes the functions described by participants. Brooks, Vincent K., GEN, U.S. Army Pacific Commander; Robling, Terry G., LtGen, U.S. Marine Corps Pacific

Commander; Howe, P. Gardner III, RADM, U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific. "Role, Responsibilities, and Procedures for the Theater Joint Forces Land Component Command (TJFLCC)." Memorandum of Understanding. Fort Shafter, HI, May 30, 2014.

⁹ Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities and the United States Army: Preparing for a Complex and Uncertain Future (Washington, D.C. June 2014), 3 http://usarmy.vo.llnwd.net/e2/c/downloads/351235.pdf (Accessed December 23, 2014)

10 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division World Urbanization Prospects: The

²⁰¹⁴ Revision, Highlights (ST/ESA/SER, A/352) (New York, 2014), 9.

http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf; improved resolution of referenced graphic: http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Maps/CityDistribution/CityPopulation/2014_City_Urban.pdf (Accessed December 23, 2014)

Land power operates effectively in this complex terrain – air/sea power alone is not sufficient, so a joint approach with a land component must be considered. Operations in a megacity are exceedingly complex with overwhelming resource and coordination requirements. Conducting HA/DR exercises with a megacity scenario can help to mitigate interoperability problems during an actual crisis response, support interoperability opportunities in all areas of engagement -including joint and combined military operations - and help prepare a global multinational HA/DR response capability. As an example, legal and medical licensing issues, such as medical qualifications and malpractice considerations, can be explored as part of interoperability. Partner nations are motivated to participate in HA/DR exercises. These exercises assist in focusing their efforts on interoperability.

Obstacles and risks associated with megacity-focused Interoperability Exercises include the possibility that countries may not welcome detailed analysis of their cities and may be reluctant to participate due to potential economic and political fallout associated with the planning failures of a particular city that may be highlighted through such exercises. Additionally, excessive focus on one specific operating environment, HA/DR in a megacity, could consume an inordinate amount of time, money and manpower which might overshadow the execution of other partner engagement activities. Regional countries' governments would have to support the effort for it to be successful. A lack of patience and significant resources accompanied with pride or political risk could hinder the effort. Considerable time investment will be needed to accommodate the planning cycle and to seek viable interoperability solutions. Countries may not be willing to accept those delays nor be willing to accept the political risk of publically revealing that they may not be prepared until years in the future. Legal aspects surrounding associated medical and financial issues further complicate megacity HA/DR planning.

Throughout the wargame, participants promoted ideas for USARPAC military engagement with the PLA, often in a multilateral context. Peacekeeping (PK) operations, however, were recommended as a potential bilateral engagement opportunity. Participants viewed PK as a potential non-contentious common interest between the U.S. and China that could be used as a means to further the relationship between the U.S. Army and the PLA while enhancing abilities to work together in potential future PK operations. Participants also believed that PK exercises would fall within the types of activities permitted by U.S. policy for U.S. military engagement with the PLA.

Risks and obstacles associated with a PK Interoperability Exercise with the PLA include difficulty in establishing command relationships between the two forces, as well as China's limited transportation resources, which could require the U.S. to either participate in China or provide transportation for Chinese forces. A U.S. political decision not to allow the engagement cannot be ruled out. The U.S. Army may also find that the forces with which it exercises are no longer considered part of the PLA as, according to the participants, China continues modifying its forces and may be transitioning its PK forces to a separate organization from the PLA.¹¹ Some regional countries may also negatively view such an engagement, and would require reassurance in order to avoid damaging existing relationships.

¹¹ Kamphausen, Roy, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds. *The PLA* [People's Liberation Army] *at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military*. (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2010), 408.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB995.pdf (Accessed December 23, 2014).

Military Professionalism Exchanges

In their review of Military Professionalism Exchanges, participants identified opportunities for USARPAC to pursue which could enhance this line of effort. Ideas included the potential to add an Army/Land Power Military Legal Exchange/ Seminar with multiple regional partners (including China) as part of a Joint Military Legal Exchange Program. Participants also advocated expanding the community of interest involved in exchanges to include other governmental, non-governmental and private organizations.

USARPAC as part of a larger Joint Military Legal Exchange Program could help regional armies to better understand international Rules of War and promote adherence to international human rights standards. This could improve prospects for other engagement activities by obviating U.S. legal restrictions against military engagement activities with participant countries. Participants anticipated regional support for such an engagement based upon continued interest in resolving territorial disputes through courts and legal processes. A legal exchange could also prove useful in expanding awareness of thought processes and approaches to problems among regional nations. Participants envisioned such engagements being comprised of small groups of subject matter experts

Anticipated obstacles and risks involved in legal exchanges included differences in regional cultural standings, rules, and beliefs. Additionally, despite the envisioned small numbers of personnel required to support engagements, there are limited numbers of military legal personnel. Additional requirements to support exchanges would need to be carefully resourced in order to maintain required routine legal support to commanders and personnel. There is also some potential that regional countries might use knowledge of U.S. legal interpretations of existing laws to their own advantage.

Regarding the proposal to expanding the community of interest in exchanges, participants anticipate that resolving future problem sets likely will require expertise not resident within military or other government institutions: e.g., specialized medical, environmental, cyber, transportation, financial, and engineering skills. Continuing advances within these fields, combined with the lack of specificity regarding future problems will require broad awareness of personnel with the requisite skills to resolve specialized problems. Intellectual exchanges and fora involving experts from government, industry, academic and other institutions could be employed in order to ensure quick access to appropriate expertise in the event of a crisis.

Competing priorities among external participants could be an obstacle with some private sector experts. Such participants may abstain from the exchanges until such time as they perceive some relevance to themselves or potential profitability of becoming involved. Care will also need to be taken to avoid perceived, or actual, compromise of trade secrets.

Consider for Reduction or Modification

In order to improve the potential to expand or initiate other activities, participants recommended that the U.S. consider modifying some of its current activities. While all of the current activities are valuable, it is possible that individual topical activities such as the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Conference; the Logistics Operations, Actions, and Activities (OAA); and Medical OAA could be merged into other existing engagement activities.

In the case of the counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Conference, participants discussed the utility in reviewing IEDs as a stand-alone topic. The perception is that regional

partners do not perceive IEDs as a significant threat in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. While continuing to exchange information on IEDs would remain valuable, the participants believed that such information could be better presented in the context of existing Counter Terrorism engagements. Merging the two activities would free up time and other resources for other engagement activities while also presenting IEDs within a framework of organizations that employ IEDs.

Similar to the IED conference, participants assessed that the Logistics OAA had potential to be included in other engagements, rather than as a separate activity. They approached this topic as something which happens in every exercise, and therefore could be addressed in the context of existing exercises. Risks associated with modifying the Logistics OAA were not discussed during the wargame, due to time constraints.¹²

Participants believed that placing Medical OAA under HA/DR Civil-Military Operations (CMO) could achieve both cost savings and foster further engagement with China. One of the challenges faced by the United States/China medical exchange is the differing country views on the focus of that exchange. The U.S Army prefers a HA/DR focus while China prefers a medical research focus. Subsuming medical under HA/DR attempts to minimize those differences. There were dissenting views on the proposed change as some participants pointed out the value and success of the current Medical OAA. USARPAC would risk losing some of those benefits by altering its current construct.

Although the State Partnership Program¹³ did not receive much discussion, USAWC analysts believe that this may indicate the seamlessness with which the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) is incorporated within the region, and the value in reinforcing this effort. Well trained ARNG members working with partners in the region can strengthen capabilities of both partners and the U.S. Army by enabling participating forces to learn from each other through shared experiences.

¹³ Seven countries currently partnered with six U.S. Army National Guard units. Mongolia-Alaska; Philippines-Hawaii/Guam: Indonesia-Hawaii: Thailand-Washington: Bangladesh/Vietnam-Oregon: Cambodia-Idaho. http://www.usarpac.army.mil/pdfs/US%20ARMY%20ASIA-PACIFIC%20LANDPOWER%20MAP.pdf (Accessed December 31, 2014)

¹² See, however, subsequent acceptability and suitability analyses findings on page 12

Feasibility, Acceptability, and Suitability Assessments

USAWC analysts conducted a post-wargame analysis of the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability of the recommended modifications to USARPAC engagement activities. USAWC personnel reviewed and evaluated each proposed activity on potential to accomplish the action with the current means available, potential cost as compared to benefit, and ability to appropriately achieve desired effects. 14 As noted in the table, three recommendations appear promising for potential incorporation into USARPAC engagement plans without significant concerns:

- 1. Build multilateral land domain relationships, such as through a Theater Joint Force Land Component Command
 - 2. Add a military legal exchange/seminar
 - 3. Expand the community of interest in exchanges to incorporate additional expertise

USAWC Analysts' Feasibility, Acceptability, Suitability Assessments of Proposed Engagement Activity Changes

Bu	ilding Defense Relationships (BDF ilding Defense Relationships & Ex ercising Interoperability (EI)	ng Defense Relationships & Exercising Interoperability (BDREI)		
	Feasible	Acceptable	Suitable	
(BDR) Reduce / Eliminate Asia Pacific Multinational C-IED Conference	×	×	Maybe	
(BDR) Add India, China and Indonesia to Senior Leader Seminars	×	Maybe	×	
(BDREI) Add HA/DR Multi- lateral Forum / Exercises	x	х	Maybe	
(BDREI) Build Multi-lateral Land Domain Relationships	x	х	х	
(EI) Add a Peacekeeping Exercise Program w/China	x	Maybe	×	
(EI) Exercise for Future Operating Environments (w/ Megacity HA/DR)	Maybe	Maybe	x	
(MPE) Eliminate Logistics OAA	x	Maybe	No	
(MPE) Eliminate Medical OAA	×	Maybe	Maybe	
(MPE) Add Army / Land Power Military Legal Exchange / Seminar	x	x	х	
(MPE) Expand Community of Interest in Exchanges / Multi-organizational Forum		×	х	

The only recommendation assessed as potentially beyond USARPAC's ability to resource with current means available was the recommendation to incorporate future operating environments into its exercises. The proposed scenario, megacity combined with HA/DR, likely would be resource intensive, thereby requiring significant changes to current engagements or additional resources in order to support conducting such an exercise. The cost/benefit analysis of this recommendation was also problematic, given that other, current engagements may already provide the ability to improve the interoperability required to address the scenario.

Two recommendations had potential problems only in terms of acceptability: adding India, China and Indonesia to SLS; and adding a PK exercise with the PRC. Identifying

¹⁴ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Operation Planning*. Joint Publication 5-0. Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011. pp. IV-2, IV-36, GL-5, GL-10

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf (Accessed December 23, 2014)


measurable benefits -- and associated data that would unambiguously demonstrate those benefits -- proved difficult for both of these recommendations, leading to analytical conclusions based primarily upon anticipated costs. The cost associated with senior leaders' available time will be an important consideration regarding expanding SLS, and will require some mitigation strategies in order to minimize such impacts. The costs associated with initiating a PK exercise with the PRC likely would include additional engagements and diplomacy to reassure other regional partners, in addition to costs of the exercise. The time required to obtain U.S. political approval for such an exercise, however, may provide sufficient time to adjust planning to mitigate these costs.

Two recommendations were identified as posing potential problems only in terms of feasibility: Reduce/eliminate the multinational C-IED conference; and add HA/DR multilateral forum/exercise. Other than anecdotal evidence collected from participants, it is possible that the C-IED conference may provide an important means to build defense relationships in the region. Similarly, existing engagements may already provide the required relationship building and interoperability improvement required to support HA/DR events.

The remaining two recommendations, regarding the Logistics and Medical OAAs, raised concerns regarding both acceptability and suitability. Eliminating the Logistics OAA as a separate engagement, and incorporating it into existing exercises may be insufficient to enabling development of partner nation self-sustaining logistics. While the cost would decrease, the expected benefit would also decrease, providing questionable acceptability. For the same reason, this recommendation fails the suitability test, as in order to be suitable it would have to achieve the desired effects. Eliminating the Medical OAA could prove acceptable by reducing some costs and, provided that there is no decrease in efficacy by transferring key aspects to other engagements, yielding the same benefits. The question regarding continued efficacy also impacts the assessment of its suitability. Based upon this analysis, leaving the Medical OAA in its current form may be more prudent than initiating any changes.

Participants during the wargame, and analysts afterwards, both highlighted the difficulties associated with developing accurate, unambiguous measures of effectiveness for engagement activities, especially for activities conducted over a relatively short period of time.

Conclusions



As shown in the illustration, most participant recommendations are anticipated to provide high potential payoff with low cost.

Broad themes regarding U.S. regional engagements emerged, especially regarding relations between the U.S. and the PRC. The U.S. needs to refine its relationship with the PRC within the Indo-Asia-Pacific engagement framework. Bearing in mind the concerns of regional countries wishing to preserve their sovereignty while continuing to balance economic reliance upon China with concerns about it as a threat, the U.S. should encourage China to agree to a shared vision of the region – preferably a peaceful, secure, stable region in which China is an active contributor to achieving that vision. With this in mind, the United States should avoid creating a perception that regional countries must choose between the U.S. and China. China's continued concern of "containment" by the United States and regional partners, along with regional countries' fears of Chinese reprisals for relationships with the US and/or resistance to Chinese aggression. Coordination and synchronization of engagement activities are critical. As national budgets tighten, coordination and synchronization in an expanded community of interest through JIIM initiatives are essential for optimizing engagement opportunities. Bolstering, rather than replacing, Asian forums whenever possible should help resolve cultural mistrust and help ease adjustment to Eastern cultural timelines which tend to have a much longer timeframe than in Western culture. Evolutionary changes, rather than revolutionary ones are in order. Scaling engagement activities to match partner capacities and avoiding redundancy are a must. Analyzing and adjusting to conflicting interests should help bolster the

success of engagement activities. Improving clear communication and interoperability should also help maximize the potential benefits from those partnerships.

U.S. land power is vital for the future in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Although largely dominated by water, the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is not exclusive to the naval domain. Army-toarmy engagement with regional partners has the potential to yield both political and military dividends. The dominant service for most partner nations is the army - many are influential with the ruling political entities and the populace in their respective countries. USARPAC engagement with those armies can assist the U.S. government, including the Department of State, as the lead for foreign policy, in meeting foreign policy goals and U.S. national interests. USARPAC land-based engagements may also help balance U.S. objectives and China's perception of containment. China may be more amenable to land power engagements and opportunities than to those that involve sea and air power. Areas of common interest – HA/DR, PK, and CT - between the United States and regional countries, including China, lend themselves to key land power roles. Bi-lateral and multilateral HA/DR engagement should grow through conferences, synchronized diplomatic forums such as the East Asia Summit, and exercises which work to improve interoperability. Exercises could include megacity scenarios involving urban littoral terrain for which land power is well-suited. PK exercises with China might be used as a stepping stone to build a relationship between the U.S. Army and the PLA. Providing additional educational opportunities and advice regarding the Rule of Law, along with further examination of legal limitations on engagement activities, may help foster conditions for expanding engagement opportunities within the bounds of U.S. policy.

Intentionally Blank

Appendix A

USARPAC Engagement Model 3 Major Lines of Effort (LOEs) with Corresponding Engagement Activities

Building Defense Relationships LOE

- 1. Senior Leader Seminars / Land Force Talks
- 2. Multilateral Forums
- 3. Executive Steering Groups

Exercising Interoperability LOE

- 4. Army-Army Exercises
- 5. Joint Exercises
- 6. Pacific Resilience
- 7. Disaster Management Exchange

Military Professionalism Exchanges LOE

- 8. Leader Development
- 9. Logistics Operations Actions and Activities (OAA)
- 10. Information / Technology /Science Exchanges
- 11. Medical Operations Actions and Activities
- 12. Intelligence Operations Actions and Activities
- 13. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Civil-Military Operations (HA/DR CMO)
- 14. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) / Conventional Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)
- 15. Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED)
- 16. Agile Mission Command

Intentionally Blank

Appendix B

Participants' Initial Assessments of Engagement Activities

I. Tally of Votes from Engagement Activity Assessment Using Initial Voting Sheets

Activity	No Change Needed	Change Would Be Helpful	Discontinue	No Opinion
Building Defense Relationships (BDR) - Senior Leader Seminars / Land Force Talks	5	11	0	2
BDR - Multilateral Forums	5	11	0	2
BDR - Executive Steering Groups	9	5	0	4
Exercising Interoperability (EI) - Army-Army Exercises	8	9	0	1
EI - Joint Exercises	10	7	0	1
EI - Pacific Resilience	4	6	0	8
EI - Disaster Management Exchange	6	11	0	1
Military Professionalism Exchanges (MPE) - Leader Development	9	7	0	2
MPE - Logistics Operations Actions and Activities (OAA)	13	5	0	0
MPE - Information / Technology / Science Exchanges	13	5	0	0
MPE - Medical OAA	10	7	1	0
MPE - Intelligence OAA	15	3	0	0
MPE - Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Civil- Military Operations	8	9	0	1
MPE - Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear / Conventional Weapons of Mass Destruction	13	4	0	1
MPE - Counter Improvised Explosive Device	11	6	0	1
MPE - Agile Mission Command	10	2	0	6

II. Overall Evaluation of Activities.

- a. After an opening briefing explaining USARPAC engagement activities, 18 participants were asked to review all 16 engagement activities under the 3 main Lines of Effort (LOEs) Building Defense Relationships, Exercising Interoperability, and Military Professionalism Exchanges and assign a preliminary assessment by marking them using the codes below. Participants were free to later change their assessments during small group discussion, but these ratings reflect their first impression assessment prior to detailed small group discussion.
 - S: leave the activity the \underline{same} as it is now no change needed the activity is working well
 - C: <u>change</u> to the activity would be helpful change can include modifying or restructuring; reducing; or increasing the activity to improve it

D: discontinue this activity - stop this activity

N: I have <u>no opinion</u> about this activity - or - I am not familiar enough with this activity to provide an opinion

b. USAWC Analysts' assessment of initial voting sheets on LOE engagement activities. The overall Military Professionalism Exchange LOE was generally viewed by participants as working well and not in need of change. Participants believed that overall the remaining two LOEs, Building Defense Relationships and Exercising Interoperability, could both benefit from change. Two engagement activities received a high number of 'No Opinion' votes, which brings into question how well understood these two activities were – Exercising Interoperability: Pacific Resilience, and Military Professionalism Exchanges: Agile Mission Command.

Intentionally Blank